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I. INTRODUCTION
The literature on private ordering examines how parties use
extralegal means-most commonly reputational sanctions-to enforce
contracts. As described by Barak D. Richman, private ordering
''compares the efficiencies of private (extralegal) contract enforcement
with the more traditional use of public law and state-run courts."'  A
series of studies by Lisa Bernstein illustrates a paradigm case of private
ordering - trade associations that use industry arbitrators (private judges)
to adjudicate disputes, with the arbitrators' awards typically enforced by
the threat of extralegal sanctions such as expulsion from the association.2
In the trade associations studied by Bernstein, the merchants opted out of
the public court system and instead chose to have their disputes resolved
by private judges applying industry trade rules.
With its focus on private legal systems, the private ordering
literature sets up a seeming dichotomy between public court adjudication
of disputes, applying publicly created laws, and private arbitral
adjudication of disputes, applying privately developed rules. Trade
association arbitrations fit neatly into the latter category; 3 public courts
fit almost as neatly into the former. But while the dichotomy highlights
the cases of most interest in the private ordering literature, it is too
simple. It gives the appearance of an all-or-nothing choice-all public
dispute resolution or all private dispute resolution-when in fact hybrid
choices are common.
This article seeks to add to the private ordering literature in two
ways. First, it argues in Part II that international commercial arbitration,
while sometimes cited as an example of private ordering, is in fact-a
hybrid case-with important elements of public involvement
supplementing the use of a private decision maker. International
1. Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a
Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2328, 2329 (2004).
2. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Merchant Law (NGFA)]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
MICH. L. REv. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton Industry]; Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamond Industry]; Lisa
Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2"s Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1999); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law]; Lisa Bernstein,
The NGFA Arbitration System at Work (Mar. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.ngfa.org/pdfs/NGFAARBITRATIONSTUDY.pdf [hereinafter Bernstein,
NGFA Arbitration].
3. For an exception, see infra text accompanying notes 23-25.
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commercial arbitration, as distinguished from trade association
arbitration, is nonspecialized arbitration between private parties involved
in international commercial transactions.4 In the overwhelming number
of cases, parties to international arbitration agreements reject the option
of having their dispute resolved under privately developed commercial
rules, the so-called new Law Merchant or lex mercatoria. Instead, they
choose to have their dispute resolved under publicly created laws.5
Moreover, unlike parties in trade association arbitrations, parties in
international commercial arbitrations often turn to the courts for aid in
enforcing awards. 6 Too often, international arbitration is grouped with
trade association arbitration in ways that blur the important distinctions
between the two. Not all arbitration is alike, and not all parties that agree
to arbitrate opt out of the legal system altogether.
Second, in Part III, this article examines attributes of international
transactions that help explain party choice among these different
mechanisms of resolving disputes. It considers four attributes: (1)
distance-geographic, as well as cultural and political-between the
parties; (2) the complexity of the good or service; (3) the clarity of the
applicable national law; and (4) the importance of speedy resolution of
disputes. Trade association arbitration is most likely to be used for
transactions in simple goods, although less likely in international
transactions involving greater distances than domestic transactions.
International commercial arbitration is the more likely choice for
international transactions, except in cases in which the applicable law is
clear or emergency relief is likely to be needed. In such cases, parties are
more likely to choose litigation in national courts. The attributes thus
prove useful in explaining differences in the choice of enforcement
mechanism across various types of international transactions. Whether
they are as useful in explaining variation among businesses engaged in
similar transactions awaits further work.
II. PRIVATE ORDERING AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The private ordering literature identifies and analyzes cases in
which parties have established private legal systems for governing their
behavior and resolving their disputes. For autonomous merchants,7 as
4. See CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 45 (1996) ("although [specialized arbitrations] doubtlessly are international,
commercial, and arbitrations, they are commonly not covered by the general literature on
international commercial arbitration").
5. See infra text accompanying notes 33-40.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 41-46.
7. An important initial question, of course, is "whether transactions will occur
between autonomous agents or within a vertically integrated firm (alternatively coined
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noted above, the private ordering literature "compares the efficiencies of
private (extralegal) contract enforcement with the more traditional use of
public law and state-run courts." 8 In other words, in its simplest form,
the private ordering literature posits a dichotomous choice between
public courts and private legal systems. 9 Public courts, with judges
selected and hired by the government, make decisions based on statutory
or common law enforced by the government. By comparison, a private
legal system is "a non-governmental institution intended to regulate the
behavior of its members."10 The paradigm example of a private legal
system is trade association arbitration, as discussed in the next section. 1
As others have noted,12 treating the choice as dichotomous-
between public courts and wholly private legal systems-is an
oversimplification. Expanding the choice to two dimensions illustrates
several hybrid possibilities, as Table 1 illustrates. The horizontal
dimension is the decision maker' 3-- either public or private-while the
vertical dimension is the source of the rules applied by the decision
maker-again, either public or private. 14 The public courts are in the
upper left corner of the table, with a public decision maker, the judge,
applying publicly created rules-codes, statutes, or common law rules.
The lower right hand corner of the table defines private legal systems,
such as trade association arbitration-with private decision makers
applying privately created rules. The other two corners identify hybrid
the 'make-or-buy question')." Richman, supra note 1, at 2329. Vertically integrated
firms have internalized the dispute resolution process and have no need to establish or
participate in a private legal system for those disputes.
8. Id. at 2329.
9. See Omri Yadlin, A Public Choice Approach to Private Ordering: Rent-Seeking
at the World's First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2620, 2620 (2000) (noting
varying definitions of "private ordering").
10. Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private
Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 4 (2004).
11. For a theory of the formation of private legal systems, see id. at 6 ("suggesting a
theory of how (and which) institutions evolve into PLSs"); Amitai Aviram, Regulation by
Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179, 1181-82 (2003).
12. E.g., Aviram, supra note 10, at 4 n.3 ("Though usually discenable, the
dichotomy between public and private legal systems is not always a clear one. Some
PLSs have a significant public backing and are very similar to public legal systems....
Conversely, some public legal fora defer to private ordering (e.g., arbitration
proceedings), and some public legal fora compete with other legal fora, and thus act more
like PLSs.").
13. Of course, "[n]ot all systems of private law have private judges or arbitrators."
Richman, supra note 1, at 2339 n.33. My focus here is on those that do.




cases-with public decision makers applying privately created rules and
private decision makers applying publicly created rules. 1
5
Table 1. Private Ordering and Dispute Resolution
Public Judges (Courts) Private Judges
(Arbitrators)
Publicly Created Rules Courts applying common
law of contracts or torts
Trade association
Privately Created Rules arbitrations applying trade
rules
The next two sections of this article examine in more detail trade
association arbitration and international commercial arbitration for
purposes of considering the extent to which they are properly
characterized as private legal systems.
A. Trade Association Arbitration
The paradigm case of private ordering is trade association
arbitration of the sort studied by Lisa Bernstein.1 6  According to
Bernstein, "[p]rivate commercial law exists in over fifty industries,
including diamonds, grain, feed, independent films, printing, binding,
peanuts, rice, cotton, burlap, rubber, hay and tea."1 7 Although the details
of the arbitration systems vary,18 some commonalities emerge. First, the
decision maker is a private party, not a state employee-usually an
employee of a company in the industry.1 9 Second, in resolving disputes,
the arbitrators commonly apply codified industry trade rules rather than
15. For another perspective on possible hybrid cases, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 319 (2002).
16. See the articles cited supra note 2. The trade association arbitrations studied by
Bernstein predominantly involve disputes among businesses engaged in domestic
transactions, rather than businesses engaged in international transactions, with some
exceptions. E.g., Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 2, at 119.
17. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 2, at 108.
18. See Bernstein, NGFA Arbitration, supra note 2, at 5-27.
19. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 2, at 108 ("The arbitrators who
decide cases in merchant tribunals are esteemed members of their trade."); Bernstein,
NGFA Arbitration, supra note 2, at 13-14; Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 2, at
1728; see also Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 859-
60 (1961); William H. Knull, III, & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International
Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 531, 557
(2000).
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publicly created rules (or industry norms or usages of trade). 20  Third,
arbitration awards are typically enforced through extralegal sanctions,
such as publicity or threat of expulsion from the trade association.2'
Only rarely do parties go to court to enforce awards in trade association
arbitrations.
Notably, not all trade associations resolve disputes through private
legal systems.22 Eric A. Feldman has described dispute resolution among
Japanese merchants participating in the tuna auction at the Tokyo Central
Wholesale Market.23 Unlike the merchants studied by Bernstein, the
Tokyo tuna merchants resolve disputes in a government-sponsored,
albeit highly specialized, court.24 As Feldman explains, "The Tuna Court
thus defies predictions that members of close-knit merchant groups will
reject formal, public courts and laws in favor of informal group norms.
Instead, formal law-bound procedures play a central role in the
interactions of tuna traders and govern their management of disputes. 25
Thus, even among trade associations-the paradigm case of private
ordering-not all dispute resolution systems are alike, and not all parties
opt for private legal systems.
B. International Commercial Arbitration and the New Law Merchant
International commercial arbitration-as the source of the "new
Law Merchant" or lex mercatoria-also is identified as an example of a
private legal system.26 Bruce L. Benson cites the new Law Merchant as
20. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 2, at 108-09; Bernstein,
Merchant Law (NGFA), supra note 2, at 1777-82; Bernstein, NGFA Arbitration, supra
note 2, at 27-28; Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 2, at 1731-34.
21. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 2, at 108 ("In most industries,
however, it is rarely necessary for a party to seek judicial enforcement of an award.
Merchant tribunals are able to place their own pressures on the parties to comply
promptly with their decisions."); Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 2, at 1737-38
(concluding it "is rarely necessary" to seek enforcement of awards in court; instead threat
of expulsion is "usually sufficient to induce merchants to promptly comply with
arbitration decisions unless they are bankrupt or in severe financial distress"); Bernstein,
Diamond Industry, supra note 2, at 129 ("In practice, however, it is rarely necessary for a
party to a [New York Diamond Dealers Club] arbitration to seek confirmation of a
judgment.").
22. See generally Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World's
Premier Fish Market, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 313 (2006).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 358.
26. See generally Harold J. Berman & Felix J. Dasser, The "New" Law Merchant
and the "Old": Sources, Content, and Legitimacy, in LEX MERCATORIA AND
ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 53 (Thomas E. Carbonneau
ed., rev. ed. 1998).
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an illustration of "the spontaneous evolution of commercial law.",27
According to Benson, "[t]he law that dominates international trade
through the use of arbitration, increasingly referred to as lex mercatoria,
is customary law.",28 The choice of terminology is not accidental: the
new Law Merchant often is likened to the medieval Law Merchant. 29 As
Peter Leeson states: "Modern international commerce is an outgrowth of
lex mercatoria, or the 'Law Merchant,' a complex polycentric system of
customary law that arose from the desire of heterogeneous traders in the
late 1 1 h century to engage in cross-cultural exchange.,
30
Arbitration certainly is widely used as a means of resolving
international commercial disputes, although the frequency varies
depending on the type of contract. 31 As a result, private judges play an
important role in resolving disputes arising out of international contracts.
But the evidence does not support treating international commercial
arbitration as a private legal system, based on a body of private
commercial law and separate from national governments.32
27. Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J.
644, 644 (1989).
28. Bruce L. Benson, To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question, 8 EUR. J. L.
& ECON. 91, 95 (1999) (internal citation omitted).
29. See Berman & Dasser, supra note 26, at 53.
30. Peter T. Leeson, Contracts Without Government, 18 J. PRIV. ENTER. 35, 46
(2003); see also LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMMERCIAL LAW 39 (1983) ("The fear of a proliferated Law Merchant has led to the
growth of a new Law Merchant, closely resembling its medieval forefather."); Bruce L.
Benson, Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law, 3 CONST.
POL. ECON. 1, 2 (1992) ("International commercial law is still largely independent of
nationalized legal systems, retaining many of the basic (though modernized) institutional
characteristics of the medieval Law Merchant.").
31. Some types of international contracts only rarely include arbitration clauses. For
example, in a sample of contracts studied by Eisenberg & Miller, only 5.0% of credit
commitments and 18.6% of merger agreements involving a non-U.S. party included
arbitration clauses. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from
Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Publicly
Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 352 table 4 (2007). By comparison, 63.6% of
international licensing agreements and 30.4% of international asset sale purchase
agreements included arbitration clauses. Id. And almost 90% of a sample of
international joint venture contracts included an arbitration clause. CHRISTOPHER R.
DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W. NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 59 (2005).
32. Historians and others have challenged the traditional view that medieval
merchant courts and the medieval Law Merchant constituted a private legal system. See
Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the
Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 21, 36 (2004) (stating that "[a] century of research
has shown" this traditional conception to be "a considerable exaggeration"); Emily
Kadens, Order within Law, Variety within Custom: The Character of the Medieval
Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 39, 40 (2004) ("The law merchant was not a systematic
law; it was not standardized across Europe; it was not synonymous with commercial law;
it was not merely a creation of merchants without vital input from governments and
2009]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
While I would not go so far as to call the new Law Merchant a
"myth,, 33 the available empirical evidence indicates that parties and
arbitrators ordinarily rely on national law and not the lex mercatoria in
resolving disputes. As Piero Bernardini concludes:
Suffice it to say that the plethora of scholarly writings on the subject
would not appear to have been matched by an equivalent interest on
the part of international operators when choosing the law to govern
their contractual relations, or international arbitrators when deciding
on the rules to apply to the merits of a case in the absence of a choice
by the parties.
3 4
I have summarized the evidence in detail elsewhere, 35 and will highlight
a few key points here. First, as Table 2 shows, 3 6 only in a small fraction
of cases do parties contract for application of privately created rules of
decision in ICC arbitrations.37 Second, although a large proportion of
princes."); Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 447, 452-53 (2007) ("While there is undoubtedly some law outside
the state, in all likelihood, a truly anational law merchant does not, nor did it ever, exist.
Law merchant proponents commit exactly the mistake for which they criticize their
opponents: they construct reality to make it fit their theories."); Stephen E. Sachs, From
St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval "Law Merchant, " 21 AM.
U. INT'L. L. REV. 685, 695 (2006) ("[T]here is no suggestion in the fair court rolls of an
autonomous legal order that spanned the continent; there might have been mercantile
laws and customs, but no Romantic law merchant."); see also Albrecht Cordes, The
Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria, 2003 OXFORD U. COMP. L. FORUM 5; Oliver
Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really
Medieval?, 65 S. ECON. J. 427 (1999). I take no position on this historical debate.
33. Peter T. Leeson, One More Time with Feeling: The Law Merchant, Arbitration,
and International Trade, INDIAN J. ECON. & Bus. 29 (2007) (special issue) (referring to
"handful of Law Merchant deniers" who treat the lex mercatoria as a "myth").
34. Piero Bernardini, International Arbitration and A-National Rules of Law, ICC
INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Fall 2004, at 58, 63.
35. Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look
at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 536-44 (2005); see also Felix
Dasser, Mouse or Monster? Some Facts and Figures on the lex mercatoria, in
GLOBALISIERUNG UND ENTSTAATLICHUNG DES RECHTS 129, 139-45 (Reinhard
Zimmermann ed., 2008)
36. As the ICC reported for 2007: "In 79.8% of the contracts giving rise to disputes
referred to ICC arbitration in 2007, the parties had specified the law applicable to the
merits. They opted for State laws in all but three contracts. The three exceptions
provided for the application of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), and the law of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law
in Africa (OHADA)." 2007 Annual Statistical Report, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Spring
2008, at 5, 12.
37. Drahozal, supra note 35, at 536-44; Dasser, supra note 35, at 139-41 ("The final
tally of references to a lex mercatoria [in clauses giving rise to ICC arbitrations] is
somewhere between 12 and 15 cases, i.e., approximately 0.3%"). Thus, the evidence
appears inconsistent with Alec Stone Sweet's assertion that "the Lex Mercatoria is
increasingly being selected as the controlling law in contracts by traders and arbitrators."
1038 [Vol. 113:4
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parties in a sample of joint venture agreements contracted for application
of "general international commercial practices," in virtually all of those
cases the new Law Merchant applied only when there was no "published
and publicly available" national law on point.38 In other words, the new
Law Merchant applied only in the absence of national law, not in lieu of
national law. Third, arbitration awards appear "only rarely" to rely on
the lex mercatoria instead of national law.39  Thus, international
arbitration largely is a procedural substitute for national courts;
international arbitrators generally apply national law, not some
autonomous body of private commercial law.
Table 2. Applicable Law in ICC Arbitration Clauses
40
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
National Law 80.4% 79.1% 79.3% 82.7% 79.3%
Other Rules 1.2% 1.3% 1.7% 2.0% 0.5%
Applicable Law Not 18.3% 19.6% 19.0% 15.3% 20.2%
Specified
Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR.
PUB. POL'Y 627, 634 (2006). A partial explanation for the differing view may be
definitional. In the international arbitration literature, the phrase "lex mercatoria" is
ambiguous. As Craig et al., explain:
Lex mercatoria seems to mean different things to different people.... [Tihe
various notions may usefully be distinguished and grouped under three
headings. First, the most ambitious concept of lex mercatoria is that of an
autonomous legal order, created spontaneously by parties involved in
international economic relations and existing independently of national legal
orders. Second, lex mercatoria has been viewed as a body of rules sufficient to
decide a dispute, operating as an alternative to an otherwise applicable national
law. Third, it may be considered as a complement to otherwise applicable law,
viewed as nothing more than the gradual consolidation of usage and settled
expectations in international trade.
W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
§ 35.01, at 623 (3d ed. 2000). Rather than one of the broader meanings, it may be that
Stone Sweet is referring to the lex mercatoria in this third sense. In fact, international
commercial arbitrators do consider trade usages in making decisions (the narrowest
meaning of the lex mercatoria) although typically not prior dealings between the parties.
Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
Commercial Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 121-32 (2000).
38. Drahozal, supra note 35, at 540-42.
39. Id. at 542-43 (quoting CRAIG ET AL., supra note 37, at 338 n.62 (in turn quoting
Yves Derains & Sigvard Jarvin, Cour d'Arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce
Internationale, 113 J. DU DROIT INT'L 1094, 1138 (1986))); Dasser, supra note 35, at 144-
45 & 157 Annex (finding thirty-eight awards "covering a time frame of more than half a
century" in which arbitrators applied the lex mercatoria in the absence of a party
agreement); Felix Dasser, Lex Mercatoria-Critical Comments on a Tricky Topic, in
RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 189,
191-97 (Richard P. Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001).
40. 2003-2007 Annual Statistical Reports, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL. (2004-2008).
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Moreover, extralegal sanctions are not the exclusive means by
which international arbitration awards are enforced. While it appears
that most international arbitration awards are complied with
voluntarily, 4' the available empirical evidence suggests that public courts
nonetheless play an important role in the process. Naimark and Keer
studied a sample of American Arbitration Association international
arbitration awards and found the following:
42
* Of 205 cases studied, 100 awards had been fully or partially
complied with, 35 were not complied with, and 51 cases
were unresolved and pending in a court action. In another
18 cases, the claimant lost the case.43
" Of the 100 awards that had been complied with, "26
respondents attributed compliance to negotiation after the
award, 61 attributed compliance to voluntary action by the
parties after the award, 12 attributed compliance to court
ordered enforcement, and one attributed compliance to a
letter demand for compliance sent after the award.
44
* "The data also show that 67 of the awards were confirmed
by a court and one was confirmed with some alteration of
the terms of the award." Those 67 awards presumably
included the 12 with court-ordered enforcement, plus "some
of the 26 cases renegotiated, as well as some of the 61 cases
voluntarily complied with.,
45
Although the results are not definitive, and the data are limited to
international arbitrations administered by a single institution, they
41. The ICC has estimated that over 90 percent of its awards are complied with
voluntarily. Pierre Lalive, Enforcing Awards, in 60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION: A LOOK
AT THE FUTURE 318, 319 (1984). But the empirical basis for that estimate is not provided,
and some have questioned its soundness. Volckart & Mangels, supra note 32, at 432
n.22 ("[T]his figure is based on verbal statements of the Court of Arbitration of the ICC
or of experts. The confidentiality of arbitration proceedings makes exact statistical
surveys impossible.").
42. Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Post-Award Experience in
International Commercial Arbitration, in DRAHOZAL & NAIMARK, supra note 31, at 269.
43. Id. at 270-7 1.




nonetheless suggest that parties use the courts to assist in collecting
international arbitration awards in a sizable number of cases.4 6
Based on the available empirical evidence, then, international
commercial arbitration cannot fairly be described as a private legal
system that operates like the trade association arbitrations studied by
Bernstein. Parties only rarely contract for application of privately
created commercial law, and courts appear to play an important role in
the enforcement of international arbitration awards.
1II. ATTRIBUTES OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CHOICE
AMONG CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
This part offers some comments on party choice among various
mechanisms for enforcing international contracts. In other words, when
do parties opt out of the public legal system for a private legal system,
such as trade association arbitration, and when do they choose instead
international commercial arbitration or litigation in the national courts?
It first identifies key attributes of international transactions and then uses
those attributes to help explain party choice among these alternative
contract enforcement methods.47
A. Attributes of International Commercial Transactions
Several attributes of international transactions help explain and
predict party choice among means of contract enforcement.48 Obviously
the attributes discussed below are interrelated, and the list is not
46. As Naimark and Keer put it, "[t]he sample seems to show arbitration in a
partnership with the courts in a good number of cases, given the awards that were
confirmed into judgments by the court." Id. at 274.
47. In addition, parties might vertically integrate and internalize the dispute
resolution function. Richman, supra note 1, at 2330. For simplicity's sake, I do not
consider this other alternative here.
48. Id. at 2338 ("the nature of the underlying transaction will consistently determine
the superior method of enforcement"); Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic
Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMiN. Sci. Q. 269,
277 (1991) ("The discriminating alignment hypothesis to which transaction-cost
economics owes much of its predictive content holds that transactions, which differ in
their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and
competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way."); see
also Fabrice Lumineau & Joanne Oxley, The Determinants of Dispute Resolution Mode
in Inter-Firm Contracts 7-9 (Sept. 26, 2007), available at http://imio.haas.berkeley.edu/
WilliamsonSeminar/oxleyl00407.pdf (proposing reconciliation of law-and-economics
and transaction-cost-economics approaches to contractual complexity and dispute
resolution).
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exclusive. 49 Nonetheless, the attributes provide at least a starting point
for analysis.
1. Distance Among Parties
By distance among the parties, I mean not only strict geographic
distance, i.e., how far apart the parties are, but also cultural distance, i.e.,
how culturally homogeneous the parties are, and political distance, i.e.,
whether the legal systems of the countries in which the parties are
located are similar.50
Distance is important in choice of enforcement mechanism for
several reasons. Increased geographical distance makes reputational
sanctions less effective. Information flows less readily and repeat
dealings are less common. 51 Increased cultural distance may also reduce
the effectiveness of reputational sanctions as well as the ability of parties
to organize groups in the first place.52 Increased political distance may
affect the neutrality of the dispute resolution forum. A party may not be
willing to subject itself to the court system of another party for fear of
bias.53 In addition, increased political distance may affect the legal
enforceability of decisions of courts and arbitrators because the legal
regime governing the enforceability of international arbitration awards
differs from that governing foreign court judgments.54
2. Product or Service Complexity
Simple products are things like grain and natural resources.55
Complex products are things with many characteristics, such as
machinery or a power plant.56 The complexity of the product or service
matters for several reasons.
49. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use
(and Not Use) Arbitration Clauses? (Mar. 19, 2009).
50. Avinash Dixit, Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement, 11l J. POL. ECON.
1293, 1295 (2003) (using "concept of 'distance,' which may be geographic or
socioeconomic, between traders").
51. Id. ("Traders more distant from each other are less likely to meet and less likely
to hear the news of each other's trading experiences.").
52. E.g., Frank A.G. den Butter & Robert H.J. Mosch, Trade, Trust, and
Transactions Costs 2 (Oct. 2003) (Tinbergen Institute Research Paper TI-2003-082/3)
(analyzing "cultural and institutional distances").
53. BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 4, at 136; GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 72 (3d ed. 2009).
54. BOHRING-UHLE, supra note 4, at 136; BORN, supra note 53, at 78.
55. Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius, & Katharina Pistor, Legal Institutions and
International Trade Flows, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 163, 169 (2004).
56. Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius, & Katharina Pistor, Trade, Law, and
Product Complexity, 88 REv. ECON. & STAT. 363, 365 (2006).
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First, product complexity affects the frequency of party interactions
and the amounts at stake in a dispute. Parties dealing with simpler
products are likely to have more routine, repeat transactions and smaller
amounts at stake in those transactions. Such parties will be better able to
organize into trade associations and to use reputational sanctions to
enforce contracts.57
Second, complexity affects the difficulty of verifying performance
under the contract and the degree of contract standardization. For
complex products, contract performance may be more difficult to verify
and contracts less standardized.5 8 Even for simple products, and perhaps
particularly for simple products, industry expert arbitrators may be able
to verify performance when public court judges cannot. As Avinash
Dixit explains:
Matters like the quantities and time of delivery of the component are
recorded and easily verifiable; therefore a contract that specifies the
firm's payment to the component supplier as a function of these
matters can be written and enforced by the government's civil courts.
But a specialized arbitrator may be able to verify more subtle aspects
of quality and fit of the component; then a contract that conditions
payment on such aspects may become feasible under arbitration.
59
Third, more complex transactions may provide more opportunities
for renegotiation during performance. Thus, according to Oliver
Williamson, "[t]he economics of governance treats simple market
exchange as a special case and features ongoing transactions for which
adaptations (of both spontaneous and intentional kinds) are needed.,
60
57. See Aviram, supra note 10, at 25 ("A reader familiar with antitrust scholarship
may notice the similarity between these criteria and the criteria that facilitate collusion
among firms. This is no coincidence, as cartels exhibit one form of behavior regulation:
they discipline firms to maintain their prices and outputs at a level maximizing the
collective's profits. A cartel fails if it is unable to enforce its mandates-the same
enforcement problem that other, socially beneficial PLSs face."). Cf RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 298 (7th ed. 2007) (listing "homogeneity of
product" as factor increasing likelihood of collusion in market).
58. Berkovitz et al., supra note 55, at 169 ("The simpler and more standardized the
type of product, the more complete the contract and the easier verification of breach of
contract.").
59. Avinash Dixit, Arbitration and Information 2 (Nov. 26, 2003), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-dixitak/home/arbitration.pdf. For an alternative approach,
examining the choice between private dispute resolution (including arbitration,
negotiation, and mediation) and court adjudication, see Lumineau & Oxley, supra note
48, at 13.
60. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS & PROC. 1, 15 (2005). Indeed, Williamson criticizes Dixit's approach, which
focuses on the verifiability advantages of trade association arbitration over the courts, as
"a truncated statement of the purposes served by this mode of governance. For many
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3. Legal Uncertainty
Legal uncertainty obviously is a broad concept and could apply to
any number of characteristics of a transaction. 61 This article emphasizes
the clarity of the publicly created law, including common law as
developed by the courts. If the publicly-created law is clear, parties may
prefer to have any dispute, particularly disputes likely to involve
relatively undisputed facts, resolved by the public courts.62 In such a
case, the expertise of arbitrators will be of relatively little value, while
the limited court review of arbitration awards would mean that any error
by the arbitrator is likely to go uncorrected.63
4. Costs of Delay in Resolving Disputes
How critical is fast action in resolving a dispute? For perishable
goods, fast action can be critical in determining whether the goods
64conformed to the contract. Moreover, for goods sold in bulk, returning
defective products is impractical and monetary allowances must be made
instead.65 In such cases, the advantage of expert industry arbitrators, as
transactions, arbitration also provides a forum with greater give-and-take, which
promotes cooperation, continuity, and mutual gains .... Id. at 14.
61. Walter Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to
Arbitration, 55 INT'L ORG. 919, 940-44 (2001) (relying on "[u]ncertainty about the state
of the world" to explain the choice between ad hoc and institutional arbitration in
international transactions).
62. Jens C. Dammann & Henry B. Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation,
94 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 34 (2008); William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance,
17 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 213, 216 (1998).
63. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2009); Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854) ("If the
award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a
full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside, either in law or
fact.").
64. DEREK KIRBY JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ARBITRATION 3 (1991) ("In
the case of cocoa beans, the arbitrators each take a handful of beans and cut them in half
with a knife to assess the internal mould, insect damage, 'slateyness' and other defects
which their trained eyes detect. For rice, each arbitrator takes a handful of up to 50
grains and physically counts how many are broken, chipped, black or coloured, compared
with the total, and thus arrives at the percentage of defective grains."); Derek Kirby
Johnson, Commodity Trade Arbitration, in HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE 267,
273-74 (Ronald Bernstein ed., 3d ed. 1998) (Commodity trade arbitrations "are based on
the original 'look-sniff arbitrations for quality and/or condition which were and are such
an important feature of commodity trading.").
65. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ARBITRATION, supra note 64, at 2
(explaining that for international commodity transactions, "returning the goods is
impractical"); Johnson, Commodity Trade Arbitration, supra note 64, at 274 ("Goods
shipped in bulk from far off origins could not be sent back if they were not to the liking
of the buyer, so each trade quickly developed a system of experts in each commodity who
could say whether or not goods were as required by the contract, or, if not, in what
respect they fell short, and what should be the measure of damages.").
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in trade association arbitrations, is substantial. For some more complex
contracts, such as merger agreements, immediate action, such as the
grant of a temporary restraining order, can be essential for effective
dispute resolution.66 Courts are best suited to act without delay in such
cases. The arbitrators must be appointed before they can grant interim
relief, by which point the benefits of emergency relief may be lost.
67
B. Choice Among Enforcement Mechanisms.: Trade Association
Arbitration, International Commercial Arbitration, or Litigation in
National Courts
Examining these attributes of international commercial transactions
provides insights into party choice of the mechanism for dispute
resolution. The three options considered here are trade association
arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and litigation in national
courts.
1. Trade Association Arbitration
As a general matter, one would expect trade association arbitration
to be most prevalent for simple goods. Such goods are more likely to
involve repeat transactions, enhancing party ability to organize and the
value of reputational sanctions. The informational advantages and speed
of decision-making of industry expert arbitrators likewise are most
pronounced in such cases.
The empirical record is consistent with these predictions. Trade
association arbitrations in fact are most common for simple goods or
services-typically, although not exclusively, commodities such as food
stuffs and metals.68 In trade association arbitrations, disputes typically
. 66. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, 59
VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1982 (2006) ("disputes in merger contracts often will be resolved
through equitable relief (for example, a motion for preliminary injunction)"). Courts may
be willing to grant interim relief in support of international commercial arbitrations.
BORN, supra note 53, at 2028-29. But when the availability of interim relief substantially
overlaps with the merits, doing so involves much greater costs.
67. STEPHEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 8 (2002) ("Parties
choose not to arbitrate for any number of reasons, including... [d]ifficulty in acquiring
preliminary relief'); Drahozal & Ware, supra note 49; see also Christopher R. Drahozal
& Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 71, 78-
79 (2008) (noting that "[airbitration providers.., have responded to this difficulty by
establishing readily available panels to rule on emergency requests, but that option
appears to be used only rarely").
68. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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arise out of standardized transactions69 with a relatively small amount at
stake. 70  Arbitrators in trade association arbitrations are industry
specialists, who have substantial informational advantages over judges
and generalist arbitrators.71
Because international transactions involve greater distances, both
geographically and culturally, trade association arbitration is likely to be
less common for international transactions than for domestic ones.
Reputational enforcement mechanisms will be less effective because of
fewer repeat dealings and more costly transmission of information.
Moreover, groups will be less homogenous, again making organization
and enforcement more difficult.
Empirical evidence appears to bear out the supposition that trade
association arbitration is less common in international transactions. As
Berkowitz et al. found:
There are numerous trade associations specializing in different
product categories. Most international trade associations, however,
do not offer quasi-legal services. We surveyed eighty-two
international trade associations, but found only three that offered
dispute resolution to their members, GAFTA, the Coca Association
of London, and the Liverpool Cotton Association.
72
Moreover, among the international trade associations that have
arbitration systems, reputational enforcement systems are less effective.
According to Berkowitz et al., rather than relying on expulsion or
69. Bernstein, Merchant Law (NGFA), supra note 2, at 1817 ("grain and feed
transactions are so standardized that the facts of any particular case are likely to be close
to the archetypical transaction contemplated by the drafters of the trade rules").
70. To illustrate, the largest NGFA award studied by Bernstein was for $138,000.
Bernstein, Merchant Law (NGFA), supra note 2, at 1817 (from years 1975-1990).
Although the amount at stake in NGFA arbitrations is larger in more recent years, it
remains relatively small. A review of NGFA arbitration awards from 2007 finds one
award in which the claimant sought $1.7 million and recovered $1.1 million (with the
arbitrators rejecting a counterclaim for $458,000) and one in which the claimant
recovered $1.3 million, but otherwise no claim larger than $500,000 and a number of
claims for less than $50,000. See NGFA, Arbitration Decisions: Nos. 2000 to Present,
http://www.ngfa.org/arbitration-decisions.cfin (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
72. Berkowitz et al., supra note 55, at 173-74 (also finding that "[flew international
commodities exchanges have active arbitration tribunals that resolve disputes among
buyers and sellers of such commodities. They typically offer such services to their own
members or to brokers: not, however, to the ultimate buyers and sellers of the
commodities traded on the exchange."); Johnson, Commodity Trade Arbitration, supra
note 64, at 268 ("There are in the very nature of things a wide variety of commodities,
and therefore a very large number of trade associations to promote the interests of those
particular trades. However, not all of the trades represented by associations in the United
Kingdom have provisions for arbitration and of those that do, there are some whose
facilities are little used.").
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blacklisting, GAFTA "refers disputes over the arbitration awards to
English courts. 73  Other international trade associations, such as the
international cotton trade associations, maintain lists of firms that do not
comply with arbitration awards. But those trade associations have
struggled with enforcing their arbitration awards, and now appear to be
seeking greater governmental involvement in award enforcement.74
2. International Commercial Arbitration
Greater distances will tend to favor international commercial
arbitration over trade association arbitration for the converse of the
reasons stated above. Longer distances make information transmission
more difficult and reduce the likelihood of repeat business.75 Distance-
of the political sort-also provides key advantages for international
commercial arbitration over litigation in national courts. Parties may
prefer not to litigate in the home courts of the other party to the contract,
and, in many cases, international treaties make international arbitration
awards more enforceable than foreign court judgments.76
Further, international commercial arbitration is more likely to be
used for complex products than for simple products: complex products
involve fewer repeat dealings and less advantage of industry expertise.
Again, the empirical reality is consistent with these predictions. In
international commercial arbitration, disputes often arise out of non-
standardized transactions with very high stakes. 77  Moreover,
international commercial arbitrators tend to be generalists, rather than
73. Berkowitz et al., supra note 55, at 174.
74. See Committee for International Co-operation Between Cotton Associations
(CICCA), Current Issues: The Sanctity of Contracts, www.cicca.info/currentlssues.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2009) (describing level of defaults on arbitration awards as
"intolerable situation" and asserting that "CICCA and its membership is clear that for
arbitration to work it must be governed by national law": "[w]hat perhaps is needed to
help reduce the level of defaulters, is a partnership between Governments and the cotton
industry").
75. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
77. In 2005, for example, over 22% of ICC arbitrations involved more than $10
million in dispute, and 4.2% had more than $100 million in dispute. 2005 Statistical
Report, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Spring 2006, at 5, 12.
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industry experts. 78 Even so, they may have more industry expertise thanpublic court judges. 79
3. National Court Litigation
So when will parties use litigation rather than arbitration in
international transactions? The above transaction attributes suggest that
clarity of national law is an important factor in party choice of national
courts, along with the greater availability of emergency relief.
80
The available empirical evidence is consistent with the foregoing
suppositions. Eisenberg and Miller examined a sample of "material"
contracts filed with the SEC and found only 20.6% of the international
contracts included arbitration clauses.81 Consistent with the importance
of distance, that percentage was more than double the percentage of
domestic U.S. contracts with arbitration clauses. 82 But that percentage is
still well below some estimates in the international arbitration
83literature. An important reason is the type of contracts involved in the
78. See Stephen R. Bond, The International Arbitrator: From the Perspective of the
ICC International Court of Arbitration, 12 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 5 (1991) (reporting
that 95% of arbitrators in ICC arbitrations are legal professionals); Jacques Werner, The
Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on International Arbitration, J. INT'L ARB.,
June 1997, at 5, 10 ("Arbitral justice in international commercial cases is almost always
rendered by business lawyers in private practice, and sometimes by academics.").
79. Dixit quite correctly distinguishes international commercial arbitration from
trade association arbitration. See Dixit, supra note 59, at 3 ("[Arbitration is] often used in
international trade because at least one party does not have enough knowledge of the
other country's laws, or fears that the other country's courts may be corrupt or biased in
favor of the home party. In this paper I am not concerned with this aspect."). By
comparison, some commentators blend the two together, despite important differences
between the two. See Benson, supra note 28, at 93 ("[T]here are many potential sources
of arbitration of international business disputes. A large number of international trade
associations have their own conflict resolution procedures, using arbitrators with special
expertise in trade matters of concern to association members .... Other traders rely on
the ICC's arbitration institution. ICC arbitrators are experts in international
commerce .. ") (emphasis added); Bruce L. Benson, International Economic Law and
Commercial Arbitration, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
(Aristides N. Hatzis ed., forthcoming 2009) ("[International arbitrators generally
intentionally 'denationalize' their awards and attempt to make them acceptable by
showing their consistency with accepted behavior of the relevant business community.
Contracts might expressly state that the practices and usages of a particular commercial
community (e.g., a trade association) should be applied or this may simply be
understood. Practices and usage (business custom) provide the default rule, at any
rate.... Bernstein's examination of the systematic rejection of state-created law by the
diamond industry in favor of its own internal rules... provides a very revealing
example .. ") (emphasis added).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63, 66-67.
81. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 31, at 353 Table 4.
82. Id.
83. E.g., KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 & n.62
(1993) ("About ninety percent of international economic contracts contain an arbitration
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Eisenberg and Miller sample. Those contracts-typically involving
corporate transactions or commercial financing-are ones in which
national law, at least U.S. national law, is relatively clear. Also
important is the need for emergency relief in disputes arising out of
corporate mergers and similar transactions, a remedy for which
arbitration is not well suited.84
IV. CONCLUSION
Both trade association arbitration and international commercial
arbitration often are cited as examples of private ordering. But
international commercial arbitration differs in important ways from trade
association arbitration. Parties to international commercial arbitration
agreements typically do not contract for application of privately created
law (the new Law Merchant or lex mercatoria); instead, in the substantial
majority of cases they agree to the application of national law.
Moreover, courts play an important role in the enforcement of
international arbitration awards, even in cases in which the parties
"voluntarily" comply with awards. In short, not all arbitration is alike,
and international commercial arbitration more correctly should be seen
as a hybrid case and not a purely private legal system.
Several attributes of international transactions are important in
understanding party choice among these and other methods of resolving
disputes. Parties dealing in simple, as opposed to complex, products and
services are more likely to form trade associations and use trade
clause.") (citing ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, ARBITRAGERECHT 134 (1988)). Gary Born
addresses such estimates as follows:
This [90%] figure lacks empirical support and is almost certainly substantially
inflated: in reality, significant numbers of international commercial
transactions-certainly much more than 10% of all contracts-contain either
forum selection clauses or no dispute resolution provision at all. It is probably
true that, in negotiated commercial (not financial) transactions, where parties
devote attention to the issue of dispute resolution, and where the parties possess
comparable bargaining power, arbitration clauses are more likely than not to be
encountered. This remains a highly impressive endorsement of arbitration, and
permits one to fairly say that international arbitration is the preferred means for
contractual dispute resolution, but more ambitious statistical claims are
unsustainable.
BORN, supra note 53, at 71.
84. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 49. Another factor that is important at least in
domestic cases is whether the dispute has very high stakes-i.e., whether it is a so-called
"bet the company" case. See Center for Public Resources, ADR Suitability Screen, item
5 (1998) (discouraging use of arbitration when "a vital corporate interest or 'bet the
company' case [is] involved that requires the full panoply of procedural protection
afforded by court and full appeal rights"). That factor seems to be less important in
international transactions, as shown by the very high stakes in some international
arbitrations, see supra note 77, presumably because of concerns about home court bias
and enforceability of awards.
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association arbitration, although less likely in international than domestic
transactions. Greater distance between the parties (geographic, as well as
cultural and political) makes international commercial arbitration a more
common choice. Parties tend to prefer courts when the governing
national law is clear and when emergency relief is likely to be important
in resolving disputes. Thus, the identified attributes help explain the
choice of the mechanism for resolving disputes across different types of
international transactions. Whether they are as useful for explaining
choice of dispute resolution mechanism across different firms engaged in
similar transactions awaits future work.
